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ABSTRACT 
 The emergence of high-performance, consumer-grade, and low-cost drones (under 
$1000), combined with artificial intelligence and low-cost computer processing power, 
have provided the tools and platforms on which to build drone swarms. In the context of 
recent weaponization of commercially available unmanned aerial systems (UAS) such as 
quadcopters, these trends present two major challenges: the possibility of defenses getting 
overwhelmed and the large cost asymmetry between currently available defenses and the 
cost of these threats. 
 Survivability methodology was used to study the susceptibility and vulnerability 
of threat vehicles. This analysis was then used to design and develop a submunition 
possessing a low-cost kill mechanism, so that multiple units could be delivered by a 
low-cost delivery vehicle. Vulnerability analysis revealed that a fouling mechanism 
would be highly effective and was therefore chosen as the kill mechanism. The 
submunition’s aerodynamics were modeled and used to develop a concept of operations 
involving the deployment of multiple submunitions from a single delivery vehicle. The 
kill mechanism, submunition, and delivery vehicle were manufactured using 
commercially available components and additive manufacturing. Experimental testing 
has demonstrated the viability of these designs and the ability to provide a defense 
against small UAS swarms with low-cost technologies. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. EMERGING COST ASYMMETRY IN WARFARE ............................1 
B. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT .......................................................2 




5. Swarm Characteristics ..................................................................4
C. OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................4 
II. THE SURVIVABILITY DISCIPLINE AND METHODOLOGY ....................7
A. UNDERSTANDING THE KILL CHAIN ...............................................7 
B. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY ...................................................8 
C. DEFINING A REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM ......................................8 
D. DEVELOPING A COUNTER-SWARM WEAPON ............................10 
III. SUSCEPTIBILITY ANALYSIS .........................................................................11
A. ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNATURES...............................................12 
1. Radio Detection and Ranging (RADAR) ...................................12
2. Infrared (IR) .................................................................................16
3. Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR)......................................18
4. Visual Signature ...........................................................................18
B. ACOUSTIC SIGNATURE ......................................................................20 
C. SENSOR EMPLOYMENT CONCEPT ................................................21 
IV. AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS ..................................................23
A. CRITICAL COMPONENTS AND KILL MODES .............................23 
1. Fault Tree Analysis and Vulnerability Reduction ....................26
B. VULNERABLE AREA ANALYSIS ......................................................29 
1. PK|H Determination Using Fragmentation ................................29
C. KILL MECHANISM ANALYSIS .........................................................31 
1. Severing Communications Links ................................................31
2. Electromagnetic Energy Exposure (EMP) ................................31
3. Heat and Blast Exposure (Thermobaric) ...................................32
4. Directed Energy Weapons ...........................................................32
5. Fouling and Entanglement Obstacles.........................................32
6. PK|H Determination for a Fouling Mechanism ........................33
viii 
V. SUBMUNITIONS AND KILL MECHANISM DEVELOPMENT ................35 
A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) ..........................................35 
1. Detection .......................................................................................35 
2. Acquisition and Targeting ...........................................................35 
3. Launch and Delivery....................................................................35 
4. Intercept ........................................................................................36 
5. Twin Engagement Scenarios .......................................................36 
B. SUBMUNITION DESIGN ......................................................................38 
1. Submunition Aerodynamic Analysis ..........................................38 
2. Bomblet Design.............................................................................43 
C. KILL MECHANISM DESIGN ..............................................................44 
D. DELIVERY VEHICLE ...........................................................................46 
VI. TESTING CAMPAIGN ......................................................................................47 
A. KILL MECHANISM TESTING ............................................................47 
1. Proof of Concept (First Generation) ..........................................47 
2. Flight Test Rig (Second Generation) ..........................................47 
B. BOMBLET TESTING.............................................................................51 
VII. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................55 
A. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................55 
B. FUTURE WORK .....................................................................................55 
APPENDIX. ......................................................................................................................57 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................59 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Kill Chain. Source: [14]. ..............................................................................7 
Figure 2. Impedance as a function of index of refraction at a medium interface. .....14 
Figure 3. Fault tree for attrition kill on a weaponized low-cost commercial 
UAS............................................................................................................26 
Figure 4. Fault tree for mission kill on a weaponized low-cost commercial 
UAS............................................................................................................26 
Figure 5. Fault tree for combined mission and attrition kills for a low-cost 
commercial UAS. .......................................................................................27 
Figure 6. Skywalker Technologies X-6 FPV Wing EPO 1500mm. Source: 
[27]. ............................................................................................................29 
Figure 7. Engagement geometry. ..............................................................................36 
Figure 8. Vertical and horizontal profiles of minimum range intercept. ...................37 
Figure 9. Grid fin modelling in SolidWorks Flow. ...................................................40 
Figure 10. Lift forces on fin design .............................................................................41 
Figure 11. Drag forces on fin design. ..........................................................................41 
Figure 12. Initial submunition design used for SolidWorks Flow analysis. ...............42 
Figure 13. Lift force on submunition body. ................................................................42 
Figure 14. Drag forces on submunition body. .............................................................43 
Figure 15. SolidWorks model of bomblet designed by Robert Wright at NPS 
Rocket Lab .................................................................................................43 
Figure 16. Initial kill mechanism design fitted with brass weights and packaged 
Dyneema net ..............................................................................................45 
Figure 17. Second kill mechanism design fitted with drop test rig .............................46 
Figure 18. Second kill mechanism with net packaged in stowage space and held 
with tape. ....................................................................................................48 
Figure 19. Nose-down deployment test configuration. ...............................................49 
x 
Figure 20. Flight test rig net firing 1. ..........................................................................49 
Figure 21. Flight test rig net firing 2. ..........................................................................50 
Figure 22. Flight test rig net firing 3. ..........................................................................50 
Figure 23. Flight test rig net firing 4 ...........................................................................50 
Figure 24. Nose-mounted submunition .......................................................................51 
Figure 25. Nose-mounted submunition on rocket in launch configuration. ................52 
Figure 26. Servo section with partially deployed fins, remaining on the rocket, 
as seen from the submunition camera. .......................................................53 
Figure 27. Front half of the bomblet falling away from rocket as seen by rear-
facing camera mounted on rocket. .............................................................53 
Figure 28. Gouging caused in the submunition stowage tube by the departing 
bomblet. .....................................................................................................54 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. U.S. DoD classification summary table. Source: [3]. ..................................2 
Table 2. Performance goals of a representative threat system. Source: [16]. ............9 
Table 3. Assessed performance of designed representative threat system. 
Source: [16]. ...............................................................................................10 
Table 4. Assumptions made for RADAR range analysis.........................................15 
Table 5. Assessed RADAR detection range results. ................................................15 
Table 6. Assessed IR detection range results for frontal profile for various 
focal lengths and probability of detection. .................................................17 
Table 7. Assessed IR detection range results for side profile for various focal 
lengths and probability of detection. ..........................................................18 
Table 8. Subsystem functional grouping..................................................................23 
Table 9. Summary of critical components and assessed kill modes ........................25 
Table 10. Summary of Vulnerability Reduction Principles applied to low-cost 
UAS............................................................................................................28 
Table 11. Vulnerable Area Determination of the Representative Threat system. .....30 
Table 12. Engagement scenarios and tactics. .............................................................38 
Table 13. Submunition terminal velocity determination using SolidWorks 
Flow. ..........................................................................................................39 
Table 14. Bill of Materials (BOM) for bomblet with approximate costs ..................44 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AGL Above Ground Level 
BDA Battle Damage Assessment 
BOM Bill of Materials 
CAD Computer Aided Design 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
COTS Commercial-off-the-shelf 
CRUSER Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and 
Research 
DoD Department of Defense 
EM Electromagnetic 
E3A Essential Events and Elements Analysis 
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse 
FDM Fused Deposition Modelling 
FL Flight Level 
FOV Field of View 
IDF Israeli Defence Forces 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IR Infrared 
LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging 
LWIR Long-Wave Infrared 
MAE Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering 
MGTOW Maximum Gross Take-off Weight 
MWIR Medium-Wave Infrared 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
RADAR Radio Detection and Ranging 
RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force 
RCS Radar Cross-Section 
sUAS Small Unmanned Aerial System 
SWIR Short-Wave Infrared 
xiv 
TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
UAS Unmanned Aerial System 
USN United States Navy 




I am sincerely grateful for the opportunity rendered to me by the Royal Canadian 
Air Force to attend the Naval Postgraduate School for over two years in pursuit of a 
graduate education for my professional development and betterment. My academic 
endeavors have been made fruitful and enjoyable because of the incredible faculty and 
staff at NPS. From the staff at the International Graduate Programs Office to the 
Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering departmental staff (Cdr. Todd Greene, Professor 
Garth Hobson, and the education technicians), the exceptional support provided has 
allowed me to pursue academic endeavors beyond what I envisioned at the start of my 
journey at NPS. 
I would like to thank Professor Christopher Brophy, my advisor, and the rest of 
the staff at the NPS Rocket Lab (Lee Van Houtte, Dave Dausen, and Dr. Josh Codoni) for 
their support with funding, advice, and labor toward my thesis project. Among the staff at 
the Rocket Lab, the support of my co-advisor Robert (Bobby) Wright stands out. Bobby 
has spent countless hours designing and building parts, guiding the various design and 
testing efforts, and providing technical and academic advice to bring this thesis project to 
its successful completion. I would also like to thank Professor Christopher Adams, my 
second reader, for introducing me to the subject of survivability and for the support 
provided in applying this field of knowledge to this thesis topic. My gratitude also goes to 
Capt. Kai Grohe (RCAF), on whose thesis work this project was furthered, and fellow 
students at the NPS Rocket Lab, particularly LT Matthew Busta (USN), without whose 
shared effort the test launches would not be possible. 
The innumerable challenges that must be overcome during a graduate education 
would be insurmountable without the tremendous support of colleagues, friends, and 
family. Particular among these were my fellow international students from my refresher 
quarter and my fellow students in the Mechanical and Space Systems Engineering 
programs. Above all else, I owe my success to the love and support of a dedicated 
military spouse and a loving child. Mena and Penny, I share this accomplishment with 
you. 
xvi 




A. EMERGING COST ASYMMETRY IN WARFARE 
Throughout history, combatants have always sought to exploit asymmetric 
advantages, as a way to maximize damage to their opponents while minimizing harm to 
themselves. The strategic goal of such warfare is rarely to defeat the enemy’s forces in 
the battlespace [1]. Often, the goal is simply to bleed resources, damage the enemy’s 
morale and to create tactical opportunities. Whereas until recently such attacks have 
primarily consisted of traditional guerilla warfare, the confluence of various 
technological developments in the last decade has brought about the advent of a new 
asymmetric threat: autonomous vehicle swarms. 
Several key technologies have converged to make this threat a reality. Swarms of 
vehicles conducting an attack requires low-cost vehicle platforms, artificial intelligence, 
and low-cost computer processing power. The emergence of consumer-grade low-cost 
drones (under $1000) combined with the aforementioned trends has provided the 
platforms on which to build large drone swarms. The cost asymmetry becomes obvious 
by solely considering the cost to defeat a single remotely piloted drone. In the most 
extreme case, the cost to defeat a single threat can exceed the wildest imaginations. In 
March 2017, Gen. David Perkins, Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) detailed how the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) defeated an enemy 
drone valued at approximately $200 with a Patriot surface-to-air missile with a unit cost 
greater than $3 million [2]. Extending this incident, it is possible to imagine a scenario 
where defenses can be easily overwhelmed, from both tactical and economic 
perspectives. As such, it is incumbent on modern military forces to consider and develop 
technologies which will be capable of defeating emerging low-cost threats at a cost match 
or near-match. 
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B. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT 
1. Categorizing Unmanned Aerial Systems 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) broadly categorized unmanned aerial 
systems (UAS) into five groups based on maximum gross take-off weight (MGTOW), 
nominal operating altitude, and nominal operating speed [3] as detailed in Table 1. 









Speed (m/s) Representative UAS 
Group 1 0 – 9  < 366 AGL < 51 RQ-11 Raven 
Group 2 9.5 - 25 < 1067 AGL 
< 129 
ScanEagle 
Group 3 < 599 
< FL 180 
RQ-7B Shadow 
Group 4 
> 599 Any airspeed 
MQ-8B Fire Scout  
MQ-1A/B Predator 
Group 5 > FL 180 MQ-9 Reaper RQ-4 Global Hawk 
 
Low-cost systems generally fall into Group 1 or Group 2. However, even systems 
in these categories can carry tactically relevant payloads. For example, the DJI MG-1 
AGRAS is an agricultural spraying drone, and can carry and disperse 10 kg of liquids [4] 
and retails for approximately $15,000. Conversely, at the opposite end of the cost 
spectrum, are drones like the Syma X-8C. This is a drone that retails for approximately 
$100 and can carry a payload of 0.2 kg. This equates to half the weight of an M67 
fragmentation grenade. Fixed wing drones, ranging in price from a few hundred to 
several thousand dollars, with capabilities including advanced sensors or aerial spraying 
are also emerging from the agricultural community [5]. 
2. Autonomy 
Autonomy can range from single features to swarm control. At the most basic 
level, commercially available drones can be programmed to follow pre-determined paths 
3 
and execute pre-determined actions, employing onboard sensors, (such as GPS receivers, 
IR, stereovision, etc.) and inertial navigation systems (INS) which normally incorporate a 
compass, accelerometers and gyroscopes. 
In December 2017, China put on a record setting aerial display using 1,180 drones 
to exhibit an aerial light show as part of the welcoming ceremony for the Guangzhou 
Fortune Forum. The exhibit was controlled by a single console and operator, developed 
by Chinese start-up eHang [6] using commercially available technologies with some of 
their own innovations. In July 2018, Intel conducted a similar demonstration with 500 
drones, at Travis AFB, for Independence Day celebrations [7].  
The evolution of artificial intelligence, will, in due course, enable an extremely 
high level of autonomy. A demonstration of a high level of autonomy, while operating as 
a swarm, was shown by DoD’s Strategic Capabilities Office. The drone swarm 
demonstrated “collective decision-making, adaptive formation flying and swarm self-
healing.” [8] The Perdix drones used for the demonstration were 16.5 cm (6.5”) in length, 
30 cm (11.8”) in wingspan, with 6.6 cm (2.6”) propellers, weighing 290g [9]. 
3. Weaponization 
Commercially available quadcopters are already being employed by various 
opposing forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In early 2017, reports emerged of the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) using quadcopters to drop various explosive devices, from 
grenades and IEDs to fused mortar rounds [10]. These videos show drone operators 
engaging in careful target selection (with a preference for lightly armored vehicles), 
descent to a release point, and post-release egress maneuvers and camera slewing for 
possible Battle Damage Assessments (BDA). These videos offer evidence that 
weaponization of commercially available quadcopters is becoming regularized as an 
option for asymmetric warfare.  
4. Cost 
The costs of a drone can vary substantially according to capability. There is, 
however, some consistency in the relative pricing of components. The major cost drivers 
4 
for drones are often the “brains” of the system, or the chipsets used to control the vehicle, 
communicate with other vehicles, maneuver and exercise collective decision-making. 
These include the microcontroller chipsets, onboard sensors, communications systems 
and motors [11]. With development of artificial intelligence chipsets, largely driven by 
commercial information technology requirements, it is predicted that costs of these 
chipsets can be driven down to $25 by 2022 [12]. Structural components and batteries are 
relatively cheap. And in the case of drones developed without re-use considerations, the 
costs for the latter components can be even lower. 
5. Swarm Characteristics 
With increasing autonomous capabilities, UAS swarms are adapting certain 
characteristics of resilient systems, in response to disruptions [13]:  
• heterogeneity—the uniformity of response to a specific disruption 
• modularity—the ability of the swarm to compartmentalize sub-elements; 
and 
• randomness—the predictability of the response to a given disruption. 
Resilient systems demonstrate these qualities in response to disruptive events. 
These events can range from systemic, external or human-triggered. The range and 
quality of response can be used to characterize the level of resilience, itself a proxy 
measure of autonomy.  
C. OBJECTIVES 
Defeating future swarm threats at costs approaching parity requires the design and 
development of several key technologies at relatively low cost. The objectives of this 
research project are to: 
• analyze and assess a representative threat system using an appropriate 
methodology to inform the development of systems that could counter 
small UAS (sUAS) swarms; 
5 
• develop a delivery system consisting of a single platform or employing a 
collection of submunitions, capable of intercepting multiple targets in a 
swarm; 
• design a conceptual framework for the employment of these counter-UAS 
systems against a swarm; and, 
• develop a compact terminal defeat mechanism for sUAS that can be 
employed in conjunction with the delivery system to neutralize the 
platforms being employed in the swarm. 
Reducing cost asymmetry will require that these systems use commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) components and non-specialized, commercially available fabrication 
techniques. As such, these technologies need to be designed and developed using 
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II. THE SURVIVABILITY DISCIPLINE AND METHODOLOGY 
A. UNDERSTANDING THE KILL CHAIN 
Weapon systems achieve a mission kill (failure of the threat system to achieve its 
objectives) or attrition kill (destruction or incapacitation of the threat system) through a 
sequence of events known as the kill chain. This kill chain, as depicted in Figure 1, is the 
product of the probabilities of those events. 
 
A successful kill requires success on a chain of events, which have individual 
probabilities. These combine to form a “Kill Chain.” 
Figure 1. Kill Chain. Source: [14]. 
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The probability of an incoming threat UAS being killed is a function of the 
readiness of the air defence system, detection of the UAS, successful engagement by 
defensive countermeasures or weapons and damage from an engagement: 
 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 =  𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷|𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿|𝐷𝐷 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼|𝐿𝐿 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻|𝐼𝐼 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾|𝐻𝐻 (1) 
A successful defensive engagement requires all components of the kill chain to 
have a high probability of success. When designing a weapon system, designers have 
some control over the detection, intercept, hit and kill phases of the kill chain. The 
remaining phases are operationally defined. Optimization of the kill chain requires 
analysis of both the threat and response systems over these design phases. 
B. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
The Survivability Discipline, significantly codified by Robert E. Ball in The 
Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design [14], can essentially 
be applied by considering two major subordinate fields of study: susceptibility and 
vulnerability. Susceptibility is concerned with the likelihood of the platform being 
successfully targeted and hit by a weapon (expressed as the Probability of Hit (PH)). 
Vulnerability is concerned with the likelihood of the platform being immobilized or 
destroyed or degraded (to a point of negating it as a threat), following impact by a 
weapon (expressed as the Probability of Kill given a Hit (PK|H). The product of these two 
analyses will provide the likelihood of a target being killed: 
 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 =  𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾|𝐻𝐻  (2) 
To assess the likelihood of a successful kill chain, analysts normally combine a 
susceptibility analysis and a vulnerability analysis. This methodology can be used to 
develop a system that will be successful in engaging and eliminating small UAS threats. 
C. DEFINING A REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM 
Development of a low-cost counter-swarm weapon requires the study of a 
representative threat system. As detailed earlier, a representative threat system would be a 
low-cost system capable of lethal swarm attacks. 
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The development of a system with such performance characteristics can be 
accomplished using commercial-off-the-shelf components with instructions from 
hobbyist websites. The instructables.com website offers guidance for hobbyists on 
building drones with a list of design steps (first 6 of 20 steps) [15] : 
1. Find a purpose for your aircraft. 
2. Pick your electronics. 
3. Estimate the total weight of your aircraft. 
4. Determine wing loading. 
5. Decide on a wingspan. 
6. Design your fuselage and tail section. 
Applying the steps to the design of a small self-designed drone, the outline of a 
self-designed drone can be defined. The target performance criteria, listed in Table 2, 
were defined as: 
Table 2. Performance goals of a representative threat system. 
Source: [16]. 
Performance Criteria Desired value 
Velocity 20 m/s 
Payload 2-3 kg 
Endurance 20-60 mins 
Unit Cost < $1000  
 
The goal of the criteria in Table 2, was to define a small UAS capable of 
delivering a payload with a similar weight to that of a fragmentation or High Explosive 
Anti-Tank warhead employed with an RPG-7. Following these steps, a representative 
aircraft was defined with a parts list and appears in the Appendix. Analysis of the above 
system, by Capt. Kai Grohe (Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)), using various online 
10 
hobbyist calculators and basic aerodynamics calculations predicted performance, is listed 
in Table 3. 
Table 3. Assessed performance of designed representative threat 




Velocity 23.3 m/s 
Payload 1.9 kg 
Endurance 20 mins 
Estimated cost < $1000 / unit 
 
This defined system represents a threat that could be employed at low-cost in a 
swarm configuration to overwhelm potential defenses. Assessing the survivability 
characteristics of such a system will allow for the definition of potential kill mechanisms. 
D. DEVELOPING A COUNTER-SWARM WEAPON 
This report will use the methodology laid out by Dr. Ball to perform a 
susceptibility analysis (Chapter III) and vulnerability analysis (Chapter IV) on the 
representative threat system, and other sUAS. These analyses rely on literature surveys of 
existing technologies, applied to the problem of countering small UAS threats.   
These analyses will then be used to design a submunition and a kill mechanism, 
and to develop a concept of operations to deploy these systems against the representative 
threat (Chapter V), using an existing low-cost delivery vehicle. Test campaign results will 




III. SUSCEPTIBILITY ANALYSIS 
Susceptibility refers to “the probability of a platform being impacted by one or 
more damage/kill mechanisms in the pursuit of its mission.” [14] The susceptibility of a 
platform in an encounter with a countering system is dependent upon three factors: the 
performance and lethality of the countering system, the characteristics of the platform 
itself and the engagement scenario. From the kill chain, susceptibility (defined as 
Probability of Hit (PH)) is a combination of several factors captured in the susceptibility 
equation: 
 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 =  𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷|𝐴𝐴 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿|𝐷𝐷 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼|𝐿𝐿 ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻|𝐼𝐼 (3) 
where, 
• PA is the probability that the defensive system is active; 
• PD|A is the probability that the defensive system detects the threat; 
• PL|D is the probability that the defensive system launches a 
countermeasure weapon against the threat; 
• PI|L is the probability of an intercept given a launched countermeasure; 
and, 
• PH|I is the probability of a hit by the countermeasure weapon given an 
intercept trajectory.  
All of these factors are largely dependent on the engagement scenario including 
the operational posture and tactics employed by the defensive system at the time of 
engagement. The greatest variability, which can be qualitatively assessed using open 
source literature, is the probability of detection (PD|A). As such, a threat platform 
susceptibility assessment based on the signatures of commercially available drones could 
inform on the detectability of a threat UAS. 
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A susceptibility assessment is “a modelling and quantification of the sequence of 
events and elements in the encounter between the aircraft and the threat against it, until 
one or more hits on the aircraft occurs.” [14] Normally referred to as an “Essential Events 
and Elements Analysis” (E3A). An effective susceptibility study would consider the 
platform’s observables or detectable signatures, aerodynamic performance and self-
protection capabilities. Scenario modeling would normally include the physical 
environment in which the encounter occurs, multi-platform deployment patterns and 
activity including flight paths, tactics and any supporting forces. With low-cost small 
UAS systems as detailed in the representative threat system, the susceptibility assessment 
must necessarily focus on observability. Swarms employing low-cost UAS are unlikely to 
employ self-protection measures on individual platforms due to cost considerations, and 
aircraft size and performance limitations. The swarm would likely rely on large numbers 
overcome the disadvantage of reduced self-protection. 
One of the key events in susceptibility assessments is the probability of detection 
(PD|A) which depends heavily on the aircraft’s signature. The lower the aircraft signature, 
the lower the probability of detection and hence lower probability of kill (i.e., lower 
susceptibility). There are several signatures that could be considered including those 
across the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, and aural signature. Quantitative assessments 
would be challenging given the breadth of the field and the paucity of granular data. 
However, it is possible to do a qualitative assessment on the different signatures and 
consider a conceptual framework for the employment of sensors to maximize the 
probability of detection.  
A. ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNATURES 
The electromagnetic emissions of a target can range from active transmissions to 
reflections of energy across the electromagnetic spectrum, including in the radio, infrared 
and visible light portions of the spectrum. 
1. Radio Detection and Ranging (RADAR)   
Radar is an object-detection system that uses radio waves to detect, identify and 
classify objects. Radar antennas radiate EM pulses in the direction of the target. When the 
13 
signal passes over the target, some of the incident energy in the EM pulse is absorbed as 
heat, some is reflected, and some passes through the material it contacts. The ability of 
the radar to detect the target depends on energy that is reflected or re-radiated from the 
target back toward the radar receiver. 
There are two schemes of radar operation: active and semi-active. Active radars 
rely on co-located transmitters and receivers to detect and triangulate a threat’s position. 
Semi-active radars combine, either an off-board transmitter or a transmitter located 
separately on the weapon, which illuminates the target, with on-board receivers which 
only receive the signals. The range of detection is governed by the radar range equation: 
 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = �







• P is the peak output power; 
• G is the antenna gain; 
• 𝜆𝜆 is the wavelength;  
• 𝜎𝜎 is the Radar Cross-Section (RCS); 
• N is the noise power; and,  
• SNR is the minimum signal to noise ratio.  
The variables in the equation change depending on the environment and 
equipment involved. The amount of energy returned is highly dependent on the radar 
cross section (RCS) of the target. The RCS is a function of absolute size, material, 
incident angle, and reflected angle. Two of these are a function of the aircraft’s design 
and can be studied using approximate characteristics of the representative threat: 
• Size. The representative threat UAS is assumed to have a length of 1m and 
a wingspan of 1.5m and a side profile height of 0.25m. 
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• Material. The representative UAS is presumed to have wings made of a 
light-weight foam material which has a relative permittivity (εr) and 
permeability (μr) of approximately 1.0. This is the approximate impedance 
of air. Since foam and air are fairly close in impedance, there is likely to 
be very little reflection or re-radiation of the electromagnetic wave from 
the target. This is shown in Figure 2, where the surface reflectance is zero 
when the impedance of the target is equal or close to the impedance of air. 
Hence, the material of the UAS is considered ‘radar absorbent’ and very 
little energy is reflected back to the radar which makes it very hard to 
detect.  
 
Figure 2. Impedance as a function of index of refraction at a medium 
interface. 
Due to their small size and the common use of radar absorbent material, low-cost 
UAS often have small RCS/ radar signature and are therefore, difficult for any radar to 
detect at ranges that would be tactically useful. For example, experimental results 
obtained by C. J. Li and H. Ling for the RCS measurements of three popular 
commercially available quadcopters (DJI Phantom 2, DJI Inspire 1 and 3DR Solo) varied 
from -9.3 dBsm to -19.4 dBsm in the 12–15 GHz frequency band depending on the angle 
of incidence and surface area presented by these drones. The authors note no significant 
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change in signature with spinning blades and a reduction in the range of 10–11.6 dB in 
the 3–6 GHz band [17]. 
Using this data and several assumptions for the radar range equation, a basic 
estimate of detection ranges can be constructed for an active system on board. These 
assumptions, detailed in Table 4, were based on work done during the ME4704 Missile 
Design course, with input from Dr. David Jenn at NPS. 
Table 4. Assumptions made for RADAR range analysis. 
Radar Characteristic Assumed Specification 
Transmitted Power 5W 
Antenna Diameter (Missile) 17.78 cm (7”) 
Antenna Diameter (Ground) 60.96 cm (24”) 
Antenna Efficiency 0.7 
Frequency 13.5 GHz 
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) 15 dB 
Bandwidth 100 MHz 
Equivalent Noise Temperature 290 K 
 
Using these assumptions, the gains for the semi-active and active antennas 
(missile and ground were) were calculated: 
 𝐺𝐺 =  4𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝜋𝜋
𝜆𝜆2
 (5) 
These gains were then used with the radar range equation to determine the 
maximum detection ranges using the radar cross sections provided by Li and Ling. The 
results for an onboard active radar, ground based active radar and a semi-active radar 
employing a ground-based transmitter and an aerial receiver are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Assessed RADAR detection range results.  
RCS Active (Airborne) Active (Ground Based) Semi-Active 
-19.4 dBsm 0.121 km 1.57 km 0.88 km 
-9.3 dBsm 0.218 km 2.81 km 1.57 km 
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These results demonstrate the challenges with employing radars for detecting and 
targeting small commercial UAS. Effective detection ranges require higher power ground 
based active radars. However, even these can be negated with efforts aimed at reducing 
the radar cross section. This can range from using low impedance materials to flight 
profiles which minimize the cross-section presented. 
2. Infrared (IR)  
IR signature is composed of radiation emitted and reflected from the aircraft 
typically in the 1 to 3 μm (Short Wave Infrared band [SWIR]), 3 to 5 μm (Medium Wave 
Infrared band [MWIR]) and 8 to 12 μm (Long Wave Infrared band [LWIR]). The general 
sources of this signature are: 
• radiation emitted by the airframe and propulsion system, 
• radiation emitted by the exhaust gas or plume from the engine and  
• reflected radiation incident on the aircraft.  
Relative to a typical aircraft, a low-cost UAS has an extremely low infrared 
signature. Especially if propelled by a non-combusting propulsion system (electric 
motors). Aside from the magnitude of the emission, the spectrum also determines which 
sensors can be most effective at detecting a UAS. Research from the Naval Air Weapons 
Centre indicates that sensors in the MWIR region are most effective at picking up 
emissions such as reflected sunlight [18]. Zheng et al. also found that the peak spectral 
intensity for UAS using a turbine occurred in the Medium Wave IR range [19]. Sensors 
using focal plane arrays consisting Mercury Cadmium Telluride (HgCdTe) or Indium 
Antimonide (InSb) photovoltaic detectors would offer high detectivity for the mid-wave 
IR spectrum. Compact commercial systems that could be placed onboard an airborne 
platform or surface surveillance system are available. These systems, however, come at a 
high cost. An example of such a system is the Zafiro HD Cooled Camera Module by 
Leonardo DRS Technologies with a spectral response of 3.7 to 5.1 microns [20]. To 
translate this into an effective probability of detection and range, criteria developed by 
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John Johnson, translated into equations by John Love from DRS Technologies, was used 
[21]: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 (𝐷𝐷)  =  �𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑡𝑡 (𝐷𝐷)  ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡ℎ (𝐷𝐷) (6) 
 
 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 (𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊) = 𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑ℎ (𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇)
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜 𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝜋𝜋𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝜋𝜋 𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑ℎ (𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇)
 (7) 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)
=
(2 ∗ No. 𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊 per Johnson criteria)
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
 
  (8) 
 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝐷𝐷) =
1000𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝 𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝜋𝜋𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
 (9) 
Using these equations and assuming a detector pixel pitch of 12 μm, with the 
number of cycles in the Johnson criteria as 0.75 for 50% probability of detection and 1.34 
for 90% probability, yields the following detection ranges for the representative threat, 
with a maximum presented area of 1.5m by 1m. 
Table 6. Assessed IR detection range results for frontal profile for 
various focal lengths and probability of detection. 




28 mm 30.7° 1.80 km 1 km 
65 mm 13.5° 4.16 km 2.33 km 
 
However, when considering a minimum presented area (side profile), 
approximated by a profile of 1m by 0.25m, detection ranges drop considerably, as seen in 
Table 7. 
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Table 7. Assessed IR detection range results for side profile for 
various focal lengths and probability of detection. 




28 mm 30.7° 0.73 km 0.41 km 
65 mm 13.5° 1.70 km 0.95 km 
 
The range of detection in the case of IR sensors is largely a function of the size of 
the focal plane array and the trade between focal length and field of view. Larger arrays 
with finer pixel sizes, increase both the range and the probability of detection. And longer 
focal lengths increase the range of detection while reducing the field of view. 
3. Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) 
Light detection and ranging systems are active emitting systems which combine 
the benefits of passive infrared red system with active illumination of the target to boost 
detectability. These systems use lasers emitting in the SWIR range, with similar arrays to 
IR receivers. Expected detection ranges should exceed those for passive IR systems as a 
minimum, with signal gains for combined SWIR LIDAR and passive MWIR, rising up to 
30 dB [22]. Such gains can overcome significant limitations with passive systems such as 
responses at range, during periods of inclement weather or where the threat UAS may be 
using coatings to minimize reflections. Commercial systems, such as the OPAL 3D 
LiDAR developed by Neptec Technologies, claim ranges up to 1000m [23]. 
4. Visual Signature 
The visual detectability of a target is dependent on various factors, including its 
size and the contrast presented between the background and the target. The ability to 
visually detect an object can be simply summarized by the visual acuity of the observer: 





• d is the distance from the object to the observer; 
• w is the width of the object; and, 
• 𝜃𝜃 is the visual angle in radians 
Average visual acuity is broadly 1 arcminute for most humans (commonly 
referred to as “20/20 vision”). As such, for a target with a profile diameter of 1m, the 
maximum distance at which the target can be discerned would be approximately 3448m. 
However, this theoretical limit is substantially reduced in reality by atmospheric effects, 
lighting, target shape, relative contrast against the background, position in the human 
observer’s field of view and relative motion [24] [25]. For example, Lappin et al. note 
that visual acuity for moving objects was limited below 0.5°/s - 1°/s for observers 
employing peripheral vision or low vision observers. Under such conditions where visual 
acuity worsens to 5 arcminutes, the range of sight would decrease to 688m for a 1m 
diameter target. Designs employing smaller visual profiles and lower contrast paint 
schemes coupled with flight profiles which minimize visual signatures, it can be 
concluded, would limit a human observer’s ability to effectively detect and discern a 
threat UAS at significant ranges. Moreover, detection can degrade to virtually negligible 
in low-light conditions.  
Electro-optical systems employing optical sensors and computer vision can 
overcome many of these limitations. Recently fielded systems offer insight into the 
performance of such systems. The CM202U Gimbal electro-optical turret is a system that 
is integrated with the X-MADIS (Mobile Air Defense Integrated System), developed by 
Ascent Vision, for the U.S. Marine Corps. The system asserts a detection range for UAS 
based on size and motion of 2–3 km, with the ability to identify and classify small 
multicopters at up to 382m [26]. These passive systems can have their performance 
substantially improved through supplementation with IR or LIDAR systems. 
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B. ACOUSTIC SIGNATURE 
Aside from electromagnetic signatures, aircraft can also emit noise that would 
impact their detectability. The acoustic signatures of sUAS offer substantial potential for 
detectability. Acoustic sensors are composed of passive sensors, usually arrays of 
microphones, which can be deployed to detect the minute mechanical displacements of 
air caused by pressure variations from rotating, oscillating or vibrating bodies. For most 
small, commercial UAS this would be the propeller or rotors used to propel or lift the 
aircraft [25]. Acoustic sensing has advantages over exploitation of the electromagnetic 
spectrum. Acoustic sensors are passive, not dependent on ambient light (making them 
insensitive to diurnal variations) and are typically omnidirectional allowing for the 
attainment of complete spherical sensing coverage to be achieved [25]. 
Research conducted on the acoustic detection of small commercial UAS indicates 
an approximate range of detection of approximately 600m. Harvey and O’Young’s 
research at the Memorial University of Newfoundland employed a Delta X-8, a small 
electrically powered drone equipped with acoustic sensors mounted on vibration 
absorbing mounts, to attempt detection of a gasoline fueled, single engine, 1.5m 
wingspan, fixed wing drone [25]. They employed three methods. The “single trial 
method” resulted in the longest absolute maximum detection range of 678m with a mean 
maximum detection range of 302 m. This method also resulted in a 63% false detection 
rate. The other two methods were forms of binary integration which reduced the false 
detection rate to under 1%, but also reduced the absolute maximum detection range to 
593m and the mean maximum detection range to 258m [25]. 
Research was conducted by the U.S. Army Research Lab using man-portable 
arrays. Employing algorithms and filtering to discount false detections, the tetrahedral 
array employed achieved a 99% probability of detection, at ranges up to 600m, with a 3% 
false detection rate [26].  However, the researchers also noted that their tests were 
impacted by other aircraft and that acoustic sensing was unlikely to fare well in a 
populated environment with several UAS operating at similar frequencies. Interference 
could result in rendering the signals incoherent resulting in difficulties tracking the UAS 
[26]. 
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C. SENSOR EMPLOYMENT CONCEPT 
To boost the probability of detection, sensors have to be employed in a manner 
that favors maximum detection. However, there remain various other factors that drive 
design of the sensor employment concept:  
• Cost. Sensors with sufficient resolution to effectively target a small UAS 
through environmental clutter would be expensive.  
• Processing power. Smaller packaged weapons or submunitions have limits 
to how much processing power and battery power can be placed onboard, 
owing to space and thermal considerations.  
• Capability. Smaller weapon or submunitions are limited by antenna or the 
size of the sensor window. By contrast, the nose cone of a missile, or its 
body, has substantially more space for a larger sensor unit. This would 
allow a larger single sensor or the placement of multiple sensors in the 
sensor window, or longer and multiple antennas. 
These factors drive the selection of a sensor employment concept that chooses 
between distributing sensors on individual kill vehicles, investing in larger sensors on the 
ground or a single centralized airborne platform that could guide several kill vehicles 
through to a successful intercept, (e.g., a “targeting hub’). Centralized sensors are 
preferred largely because of their favorability on these factors. Centralized sensors, by 
virtue of fewer restrictions on size can offer higher capability, greater processing power, 
and the opportunity to limit costs by concentrating investment into fewer large sensors.  
Fewer sensors also allows for layering and combination of various sensor systems 
into networks to maximize detection under various conditions (lighting, weather, terrain, 
distribution, etc.). The combination of fixed or mobile radars with portable passive 
electro-optical/IR sensors or LIDARs allows for maximum detection of small UAS 
swarms. To effectively target small UAS with individual submunitions while considering 
these factors, it is suggested that a targeting hub positioned over the engagement area 
would be most suited to intercept a small swarm of low-cost UAS. The small size of 
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commercial UAS and the materials used to construct them suggest that a LIDAR or 
MWIR system onboard would be able to take advantage of secondary emissions from 
these aircraft. 
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IV. AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
Vulnerability concerns the likelihood of a platform surviving an impact from a 
kill mechanism designed to destroy the platform itself or impede its function [14]. In the 
survivability equation, vulnerability is denoted as PK|H. To assess vulnerability, a fault 
tree analysis and a vulnerable area assessment can be employed (as prescribed by Dr. 
Ball). A fault tree analysis lays out the kill chain of critical subsystems which, if broken, 
would render the system vulnerable to an attrition kill [14]. In order to determine a 
numerical value for vulnerability, a vulnerable area assessment can be employed. 
A. CRITICAL COMPONENTS AND KILL MODES 
The subsystems of a UAS can be grouped into two functional groups, detailed in 
Table 8, with one group encompassing all systems essential to flight and a second group 
essential to the performance of the mission. 
Table 8. Subsystem functional grouping. 







Video or data links 
Targeting systems 
 
These subsystems have specific technical or functional vulnerabilities, 
summarized in Table 9, which represent kill modes that can be used to effect the failure 
of flight (resulting in an attrition kill) or mission (representing a mission kill): 
• Aerostructure. Most low-cost commercial UAS are made of low-density 
materials, with the outer structure bearing very limited aerodynamic 
loading. As such, low grain kinetic impacts are unlikely to result in 
catastrophic failure of the aerostructure. Instead, the likely outcome is a 
steady degradation of lift generation, resulting in deterioration of aircraft 
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manoeuvrability, altitude sustainment and speed sustainment. In further 
analysis, the aerostructure is treated as less critical and considered as the 
total area against which other critical areas were measured. 
• Control Systems. The Control Systems functions are accomplished by 
various subsystems including the guidance and navigation systems, flight 
control surfaces and their actuators, and processor systems for autonomous 
operations and flight control. Damage that substantially degrades or 
destroys any of these subs-systems is likely to lead to an attrition kill 
through a loss of control of the aircraft.  
• Battery. Power for low-cost drones is most often provided by a battery. 
The battery group usually consists of a battery and its connections to the 
motors. On more sophisticated aircraft, there may be additional electronics 
which provide thermal management of the battery. Interruption of power, 
either by cutting the battery link to the motor or by damage or destruction 
of the battery will result in an immediate attrition kill through loss of 
thrust and/or loss of control of the aircraft. 
• Propulsion. The propulsion group usually includes the electric motor, 
driveshaft and propeller. Most of these components are not redundant. 
And damage to any of these components will result in loss of thrust and a 
subsequent attrition kill.  
• Communications, Video and Data Links. Backhaul communications links 
may be required for control of the aircraft or to initiate payload release or 
counter enemy defensive actions. Severing communications links will 
only result in an attrition kill if the aircraft is wholly dependent on remote 
control for direction. Aircraft can however, be outfitted and programmed 
to operate autonomously. This would render any loss of communications 
less relevant. Severing communications links could result in an attrition 
kill, but a mission kill is far more likely. In the event that the aircraft is 
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fully autonomous though, loss of communications is unlikely to have any 
impact on the aircraft. This assessment consider the likelihood for full 
autonomy high and therefore disregards communications links from 
further consideration as a critical component. 
• Weaponized Payload. The payload represents a large surface area for the 
aircraft. It is also the most volatile of the critical components. Significant 
damage could result in deflagration of the payload, resulting in immediate 
destruction of the aircraft. Mission failure could also be incurred by 
preventing a successful deployment or fusing of the payload. 
• Targeting Systems. Depending on the platform, this could range from 
some kind of seeker to a proximity fuse. Damage or destruction of this 
subsystem may result in a mission kill. An attrition kill is unlikely. 
Table 9. Summary of critical components and assessed kill modes 
Critical Components Assessed Kill Modes 
Aerostructure Loss of Lift 
Structural compromise or failure 
Control Systems Autonomous and flight control systems processors 
Actuator Failure 
Flight Control Surface damage or failure 
Guidance systems failure 
Battery Battery Disconnection 
Catastrophic battery failure (puncture, fire, thermal 
runaway) 
Propulsion Propeller/drive shaft failure 
Electric Motor failure 
Communications Links / 
Video or Data Links 
Loss of video or sensor feed 
Loss of backhaul communications links 
Weaponized Payload Release separation failure 
Trigger/fuse failure 
Deflagration of the warhead/payload 
Targeting Systems Sensor failure 
Data processor failure 
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1. Fault Tree Analysis and Vulnerability Reduction 
Considering systems vital to the flight and mission functions of the aircraft which 
represent critical systems, this is the fault tree (shown in Figure 3) that can be generated 
for an attrition kill. 
 
Figure 3. Fault tree for attrition kill on a weaponized low-cost 
commercial UAS. 
Similarly, considering systems essential to the performance of the mission by not 
necessarily required for they systems operations, the mission kill tree (depicted in Figure 
4), can be generated. 
 
Figure 4. Fault tree for mission kill on a weaponized low-cost 
commercial UAS. 
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Combining the fault trees in Figure 3 and Figure 4 leads to the kill tree shown in 
Figure 5: 
 
Figure 5. Fault tree for combined mission and attrition kills for a 
low-cost commercial UAS. 
From the Figure 5, it is clear that sUAS do not observe the several Vulnerability 
Reduction principles as detailed by Dr. Ball, and summarized in Table 10. There are 
various approaches that can be used to provide some reduction in vulnerability to an 
encounter with a threat to the platform [14]: 
• Component Redundancy. The small size of commercial UAS airframes, 
and the low-cost limit does not allow for the employment of redundant 
systems. Incorporating redundancy, would require dramatic increases in 
cost, while increasing both vulnerable areas and possibly the overall size 
of the aircraft. 
• Component Location. This principle may be employed. And the most 
likely method would be the placement of system components such that 
that their vulnerable area is reduced in the largest presented profile (the 
planform profile). 
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• Passive and Active Damage Suppression. Cost prohibitions and space 
limitation severely limit the ability to employ damage suppression 
techniques or technologies. Low-cost UAS often use commercial-off-the-
shelf components. As such, damage and ballistic tolerance are unlikely to 
incorporated. Active suppression systems such as fire suppression bottles 
are also unlikely for size, cost and complexity reasons. 
• Component Shielding. As with some of the other principles, cost, 
complexity and size considerations reduce the likelihood that components 
will be adequately shielded. Additionally, the aircraft will have a limited 
payload. Shielding would reduce payload capability, reducing the 
effectiveness of the platform.  
• Component Elimination or Replacement. This principle is likely to be 
employed, simply through technological advancements. Electronics 
packages that fulfil multiple functions could result in component 
elimination or replacement with smaller or more effectively shaped 
components, reducing the net vulnerable area. 
Table 10. Summary of Vulnerability Reduction Principles applied to 
low-cost UAS. 
Vulnerability Reduction Principle Applied? 
Component Redundancy No 
Component Location Yes 
Passive Damage Suppression No 
Active Damage Suppression No 
Component Shielding No 
Component Elimination or Replacement Yes 
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B. VULNERABLE AREA ANALYSIS 
1. PK|H Determination Using Fragmentation
To assess the probability of kill of a low-cost commercial UAS against a 
fragmentation warhead, the components of the representative threat system were used 
with approximate dimensions to model vulnerable areas compared to a triangular 
planform. This planform was based on the Skywalker Technologies X-6 FPV Wing 
shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Skywalker Technologies X-6 FPV Wing EPO 1500mm. 
Source: [27]. 
This analysis includes some assumptions: 
• Aerostructure was not considered a critical component and provided the
baseline presented area. Fragments can penetrate and damage the
aerostructures (usually made of foam) without causing failure.
• Components were placed such that they maximized their presented area on
the planform profile.
• The side profile was assumed to have a low of probability of hit and not
assessed for PK|H.
These assumptions lead to the estimation of vulnerable areas, detailed in Table 11. 
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Table 11. Vulnerable Area Determination of the Representative 
Threat system. 
Component L (mm) W (mm) Presented Area (AP) (m2) 
Motor 50 55 0.00275 
Propeller 13 12 0.000156 
Battery 168 69 0.011592 
Controller 45 24 0.00108 
Guidance 43.18 38.1 0.00164516 
Servos (4) 75 75 0.0225 




Total Vulnerable Area (AV)  0.05240316 
 
Flying Wing Body 
(Aerostructure) (AP) 
L*W*0.75 
660 1500 0.7425 
 
Comparing the vulnerable area against the planform of the aerostructure provided 
for a determination of probability of kill given hit (single shot or fragment): 





 ≈ 0.071 (10) 
The probability of a fragment impact on a critical area could be increased by 
increasing the aereal density of the fragments. However, the scaling of the fragment spray 
area scales geometrically as radius increases if only the sidewalls of a cylindrical 
warhead are considered: 
 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋 𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠 = 2𝜋𝜋𝑇𝑇ℎ (11) 
Therefore, simply doubling the radius results in a 50% reduction in the aereal 
density of fragments. Therefore, a fragmentation warhead would have to be fused 
relatively close to the target. At approximately 14r, the aereal density approaches that of 
the probability of kill given hit. Given the size of most compact warheads, this would 
imply a minimum fusing distance of substantially less than 10m to achieve an increase in 
the probability of a fragment successfully striking a vulnerable area. 
The low probability of kill given a hit, and the requirement for fusing to occur 
relatively close to these small and relatively agile systems, demonstrates the futility of 
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using ballistic propagators (bullets) or blast generated fragments as a method of 
damaging a small UAS. And this assessment portrays a best case scenario where there is 
no overlap between components or shielding and where the fragment is provided a 
planform view normal to the path of travel. This idealized case is extremely unlikely to 
occur in real-world engagements. As such, the employment of kinetic propagators must 
be ruled out. This analysis suggests the study of alternative kill mechanisms is necessary. 
C. KILL MECHANISM ANALYSIS 
Where high velocity grains were shown to be have a low likelihood of inflicting 
damage, other modes of effecting an attrition or mission kill can be considered. 
1. Severing Communications Links 
Severing communications links can interrupt flight control and guidance, or video 
feedback to the operators. If the weaponized payload is command activated, it could 
prevent fusing/activation of onboard explosives. However, as detailed in Chapter I, the 
onset of low-cost processors suited to autonomous operations may render such a kill 
mechanism ineffective. Drones can be designed to fly pre-programmed routes or to 
execute pre-programmed manoeuvres to both minimize susceptibility or in response to a 
loss of communications. Some commercial UAS already demonstrate this capability with 
a programmable “return to home” function, which instructs the platform to fly to a pre-
determined geographic coordinate in the event of a loss of communication with operators 
[28]. As such, simply severing communications/command links would be ineffective in 
eliminating the UAS threat. 
2. Electromagnetic Energy Exposure (EMP) 
Electromagnetic pulses could be used to overwhelm unshielded electronics 
onboard a UAS. Recent advances in electromagnetic pulse (EMP) technology have 
resulted in the development of experimental weapons such as the Counter-Electronics 
High-Powered Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP), built under partnership between 
Raytheon and Boeing [29]. An EMP system, however, has numerous disadvantages. It 
increases the risk of collateral, since it is an indiscriminate weapon. As such, friendly 
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systems that maybe unshielded nearby also risk damage. Minimization remains a 
challenge, with the CHAMP designed as an area weapon that would target large areas 
including whole cities. It also remains to be proven that the costs of a high technology 
weapon such as EMP devices can be achieved with cost parity approaching that of a 
conventional commercial UAS swarm. 
3. Heat and Blast Exposure (Thermobaric) 
Thermobaric weapons use intense heat and blast pressure to destroy targets. Their 
sizes can range from air-dropped munitions (such as the AGM-114N Hellfire II) to 
shoulder fired man-portable weapons (Mk. 153 SMAW) used to target bunkers and 
hardened structures by infantry [30] [31]. Thermobaric weapons face similar issues to 
EMPs. As indiscriminate weapons, the risk of damage to close operating friendly forces 
is substantial. The handling of explosives will also drive cost requirements substantially, 
resulting in a cost overmatch that is the core of the counter-UAS problem presented in 
Chapter I. 
4. Directed Energy Weapons 
Various forces are fielding kilowatt class lasers to counter threats from UAS. 
Aside from the cost of fielding such systems, lasers face various challenges in their 
employment [32]. Lasers can usually only engage a single target at a time. The lasers 
must maintain a specific spot on the target to allow for the rapid increase in spot 
temperature that thermally destroys the spot area. This results in a relatively high duration 
of engagement (measured in seconds) and the possibility that the spot targeted will not 
result in destruction of the aircraft (in a similar manner to holes punched into the foam 
wings or non-critical elements of UAS by fragmentation warheads) [33]. Relatively lower 
power lasers can also be countered through the use of materials such as reflective 
coatings [34]. 
5. Fouling and Entanglement Obstacles 
Fouling and entanglement devices are already being fielded by various forces to 
counter low-cost and low-performance UAS [35]. Devices can range from pre-
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constructed netting acting as barriers to man-portable netguns which can fire deployable 
nets that will foul the propulsion system of the UAS. Large nets negate the requirement 
for a strike on a vulnerable area. If the net can foul the propeller or be wrapped around 
the UAS, it is highly likely to result in sufficient loss of thrust or destabilization (in the 
case of multi-rotor systems) to result in an attrition kill. With sufficient development, 
fouling mechanisms could be combined with other mechanism ranging from heavy 
weights to energized wires passing high voltage through the UAS. 
There are numerous advantages to deploying a fouling or entanglement device. 
Such devices are scalable, reusable in some circumstances, can be tailored to a delivery 
system and involve little to no handling of explosives. These inherent advantages ensure 
cost-parity that should reduce the severe cost-overmatch faced by today’s systems. 
Employing a non-destructive kill mechanism also affords the opportunity for recovery of 
threat UAS systems for the purposes of intelligence collection. 
6. PK|H Determination for a Fouling Mechanism 
Since a fouling mechanism is usually targeting the propeller, the vulnerable area 
changes substantially. Consider the representative threat system. With a 305 mm 
diameter, the propeller of the system has a disk area of 0.2922 m2. The frontal area 
presented by the flying wing body was constructed based on some assumptions and given 
data: 
• 1500 mm wingspan 
• 20 cm chord length (based on similar airfoils operated by the NPS 
CRUSER group) 
• 2.4 cm uniform airfoil thickness based on 12% thickness to chord ratio 
[36]. 
• A slung RPG-7 that is presenting a disk of 40 mm diameter. 
• A propeller that completely covers the fuselage body (negating its area), 
due to co-axial placement of the propulsion system. 
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Based on these assumptions, the frontal area excluding the propeller disk was 
found to be 0.33 m2. Considering the propeller as the sole vulnerable area in the frontal 
plane, suggests a very high vulnerability to damage to the propeller: 





 ≈ 0.8854 (12) 
Similarly, approaching a multi-rotor (such as a quadcopter) from above the rotor 
disks’ plane would present a substantial vulnerable area with the sum of the rotor disk 
areas dominating the total presented area. 
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V. SUBMUNITIONS AND KILL MECHANISM DEVELOPMENT 
A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) 
In order to develop and deliver kill mechanisms effectively, the framework under 
which such a weapon system is employed must be defined. This framework is referred to 
as the concept of operations. The CONOPS covers all the events in the kill chain which 
can be broadly grouped into four phases of the engagement: 
1. Detection
In the detection phase, early warning sensors provide an indication of the 
presence of threat systems (individual or swarm) inbound. For the case of this 
development, the presumed sensor was the CM202U Gimbal electro-optical turret 
integrated with the X-MADIS (Mobile Air Defense Integrated System), developed by 
Ascent Vision. The system asserts a detection range for UAS based on size and motion of 
2–3 km [24]. 
2. Acquisition and Targeting
This is the phase during which a threat is identified, its track is passed to a 
weapons system and a solution is computed. The X-MADIS system asserts an 
identification range of 382m. Depending on rules of engagement, this may be lowest 
range at which a delivery vehicle may be launched. 
3. Launch and Delivery
A delivery vehicle is launched and flies to an appropriate separation point. For a 
swarming threat, this would be at a “perch point,” a location at a relative azimuth and 
altitude to the swarm’s centroid, which would allow submunitions to successfully 
intercept several incoming threat systems. While at the perch point, the delivery system 
releases submunitions based on a pre-determined engagement strategy which considers 
the speed of incoming threat systems, the possibility of re-engagement, and other factors. 
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4. Intercept
Submunitions take up a track that would intercept the target at a pre-determined 
point in space (proportional navigation) or a track that would result in overtaking the 
target (pursuit guidance). When the submunition is sufficiently close to the threat, fusing 
sensors activate the kill mechanism to deploy and effect a kill. 
5. Twin Engagement Scenarios
Assuming the seeker has a 30° field of view, at an altitude where the delivery 
vehicle is 457m (1500 ft) over the swarm centroid, results in a sight radius of 123m (402 
ft) laterally. The approximate geometry of the engagement is depicted in Figure 7. 
Figure 7. Engagement geometry. 
As such, the intercept has to take place within a FOV of a diameter of 
approximately 244m (800 ft). The profiles are summarized in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Vertical and horizontal profiles of minimum range 
intercept. 
Given that terminal velocity for the submunition was estimated at approximately 
55 m/s (123 mph) through numerical simulations, this would indicate a maximum 
velocity of approximately 198 km/h. To achieve terminal velocity, the submunition 
would have a distance of 154m (505 ft) and time of 5.6s, determined using kinematics: 
 
 𝑣𝑣 =  𝑣𝑣02  +  gt (13) 
 𝑣𝑣2  =  𝑣𝑣02  +  2g∆𝑧𝑧  (14) 
where g = 9.81 m/s2, V0 = 0 ft/s, V = 55 m/s. 
The total time for the submunition to descend 457m would be a minimum of 
11.12s. As such, targets or swarms traveling at speeds greater than 22 m/s, would result 
in the target exiting the FOV before the submunition would be able to execute a 
successful intercept. As such, it was decided to bifurcate the concept of operations to 
operate under two threat scenarios. The threshold was decided to be 18 m/s 
(approximately 65 km/h or 40 mph).  
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The velocity of the swarm determines the actions undertaken by the delivery 
vehicle at the perch point as shown in Table 12. 
Table 12. Engagement scenarios and tactics. 
Low Speed (< 18 m/s) High Speed (≥ 18 m/s) 
Delivery vehicle arrives at perch point, 
stabilizes and waits for acquisition of 
incoming targets before releasing 
submunitions. 
 
Submunitions employ pursuit guidance to 
intercept targets. 
Delivery vehicles arrives at perch point, 




Targeting hub onboard the Delivery 




Submunitions employ proportional 
navigation guidance to intercept targets. 
 
 
B. SUBMUNITION DESIGN 
A low-cost bomblet was designed using CAD software (SolidWorks) to package 
servos for control, a video camera, and transmitters and receivers for video links and 
flight control. These components were mounted in a custom designed housing, with an 
electronics mounting board and servo housing that were manufactured using three 
dimensional (3D) FDM additive manufacturing. Control was enabled using printed 
slatted fins, which were designed on SolidWorks and analyzed using SolidWorks Flow. 
 
1. Submunition Aerodynamic Analysis 
The bomblet was analyzed for several aerodynamic considerations, using 
SolidWorks Flow Simulation, a potential flow solver, to provide approximations for 
comparative analysis. The first consideration was to determine the terminal velocity of 
the bomblet. The second was to determine whether grid or slatted fins were more 
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appropriate for control of the submunition. And finally, to determine body forces on a 
submunition body modified to take a payload. 
a. Terminal Velocity Determination 
To determine the terminal velocity of the submunition, a basic submunition 
design (shown in Figure 12) was studied at various flow velocities in the direction of 
travel. Results are shown in Table 13. Terminal velocity was found when the drag forces 
were equal to the gravitational forces. For a starting mass of 0.522 kg, the approximate 
velocity was found to be 55 m/s (~123 mph). 
Table 13. Submunition terminal velocity determination using 
SolidWorks Flow. 
Speed (m/s) GG(X) GG(Y) GG(Z) 
50 -0.0638831 N 0.409218 N 4.22513 N 
55 -0.0767285 N 0.507823 N 5.09617 N 
56 -0.0909843 N 0.540735 N 5.28914 N 
60 -0.105083 N 0.60961 N 6.06636 N 
   Gravitational Forces    
Mass (g) 522 Target Drag (N) 5.12082 
Note: Highlighted cells are the points of comparison between calculated drag and SolidWorks 
Flow approximation. 
 
b. Fin Selection 
Two types of fins were considered for control of the submunition: a grid fin 
depicted in Figure 9 and a slatted fin. SolidWorks Flow was used to determine forces 
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acting on the individual fins. Angle of attack was simulated by varying the flow field 
from the normal direction to the surface of the fin. 
 
Figure 9. Grid fin modelling in SolidWorks Flow. 
Lift and drag forces were analyzed for both the slatted and grid fins, and plotted in Figure 
10 and Figure 11. 
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Figure 10. Lift forces on fin design 
 
Figure 11. Drag forces on fin design. 
The SolidWorks Flow analysis revealed that slatted fins were more suitable for 
the bomblet since they generated less drag and produced more lift compared to the grid 
fins. These higher lift forces could be used to generate higher turning moments on the 
bomblet. 
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c. Body Forces 
To study body forces, an approximate model was constructed, shown in Figure 12 
using the dimensions of the kill mechanism, to construct a payload area behind the nose 
cone. 
 
Figure 12. Initial submunition design used for SolidWorks Flow 
analysis. 
Body lift and drag forces were analyzed at different angles of attack, as shown in 
Figure 13 and Figure 14. 
 
Figure 13. Lift force on submunition body. 
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Figure 14. Drag forces on submunition body. 
This analysis shows that drag tends to remain approximately constant through 
most angles of attack, while lift changes substantially. This analysis could be used to 
inform maneuvering schema such as high lift flight profiles to reduce the rate of descent.   
2. Bomblet Design 
The final submunition design was a “bomblet” designed and built by Robert 
Wright at the NPS Rocket Lab to package all the required components. 
 
Figure 15. SolidWorks model of bomblet designed by Robert Wright 
at NPS Rocket Lab 
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The bomblet aimed to package several low-cost components listed in Table 14. 
Table 14. Bill of Materials (BOM) for bomblet with approximate 
costs 
Component Qty. Approx. Unit Cost ($) 
Futaba S3154 High-Torque/High-Speed Servos 4 55 
Luminere 600 mW transmitter 1 50 
Spektrum AR400 receiver 1 30 
Omnidirectional right-hand polarized antenna 2 40 
PerfectFlite Stratologger CF deployment altimeter 1 50 
Lithium-Polymer 500 mA 2-cell battery 1 25 
MicroSD Card 1 30 
RunCam Split Mini 2 FPV HD Camera 1 80 
Additive printing plastics reel 1 50 
Screws, pins and custom springs As req. 0.25 
 
As can be seen in Table 14, the approximate cost of components used in the 
bomblet was $625. And the form factor ensured that the four of these devices could be fit 
into a 191 mm (7.5 in.) diameter standard rocket tube, used by the NPS Rocket Lab as the 
proposed delivery vehicle. Custom parts were manufactured using additive 
manufacturing (“3D printing”) employing an Ultimaker 3 Extended printer and its 
proprietary Cura software (version 3.4.1). 
C. KILL MECHANISM DESIGN 
A kill mechanism was designed to deploy a net as a fouling mechanism. A conical 
housing for a net was placed on top of a combustion chamber with passages to four 
chambers containing machined brass weights. An electrically activated fuse (E-Match) 
was used to ignite black powder in the combustion chamber. Expanding gases caused by 
the deflagration of the black powder displaced the brass weights at high velocity, 
spreading the 3.3 m2 (36 ft2) Dyneema net and deploying it in the direction of the 
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longitudinal axis of the kill mechanism. The mechanism was designed on SolidWorks 
and manufactured using additive manufacturing on the Ultimaker printer. 
Two designs were tested. The first design (shown in Figure 16) was a proof of 
concept, designed to ensure that the plastic used to manufacture the kill mechanism could 
survive the forces of the expanding gases created by combustion of the black power. 
 
Figure 16. Initial kill mechanism design fitted with brass weights and 
packaged Dyneema net 
The second design (shown in Figure 17) was designed for repeatable testing and 
was fitted to a flight test rig, designed to be dropped from altitude, with other bomblet 





Figure 17. Second kill mechanism design fitted with drop test rig 
D. DELIVERY VEHICLE 
The delivery vehicle to be employed was a rocket previously designed by Capt. 
Kai Grohe (RCAF) as part of his thesis work at NPS. The main body of this rocket is a 
fiberglassed phenolic tube of 191 mm (7.5 in) internal diameter from Public Missiles. 
The BOM costs for this rocket with its motor, servos, avionics, fins and other structural 
elements was estimated at $4300 in 2017 [16]. This rocket was modified to enable the 
fitting of four bomblets internally with a payload bay which would release the bomblets 
during separation from the booster. Subsequently, for testing purposes, a single bomblet 
stowage tube was installed in the nose fairing instead of the payload bay.  
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VI. TESTING CAMPAIGN 
Several tests were undertaken of the kill mechanism and a single flight test of a 
completed submunition (bomblet) was attempted. 
A. KILL MECHANISM TESTING 
1. Proof of Concept (First Generation) 
The design depicted in Figure 16 was tested with lab pneumatic air feed on 18 
October 2018. It was found that the pneumatic air lines did not deliver sufficient pressure 
and flow rates to deploy the net. A second test was then conducted, on 19 October 2018, 
with approximately 1g of black powder ignited by an E-match. The net did not unfurl and 
proceeded to travel over 18m as a clumped mass with the brass weights entangled.   
 
The second test, while not adequately deploying the net, did reveal that sufficient 
pressure could be developed in the combustion chamber to successfully separate the net 
and eject the brass weights at high speed. It was subsequently decided to carry forward 
with the concept with additional modifications to be made: 
• Build the mechanism as a single mass with voided spaces for the 
combustion chamber and passages to the brass weights. 
• Substantially enlarge the stowage space for the net. 
• Substantially shrink the combustion chamber to reduce the amount of 
empty volume around the black powder required while maintaining 
sufficient pressure to deploy. 
 
2. Flight Test Rig (Second Generation) 
The design shown in Figure 17 was tested on 01 November 2018 with 0.805g of 
black powder used to deploy the throw weights and net. The kill mechanism, without the 
flight test rig is shown in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Second kill mechanism with net packaged in stowage space 
and held with tape. 
The test proved that the modifications made from the proof of concept were much 
more effective in successful separation of the net, unfurling it and spreading it to a larger 
effective area.   
A second test was conducted on 08 November, with 0.812g of black powder, and 
with a cover plate added to the kill mechanism, to fully enclose the net. The goal of the 
test was to ensure successful separation of the cover and the net. The results were mixed. 
The cover successfully separated and cleared the net mechanism. However, the net did 
not spread completely and became partially entangled. It was decided that net packing 
would be modified to reorder the net’s main lines attached to the throw weights, so that 
the lines were at the front of the net stowage volume. 
A third test was intended to be conducted by attaching the kill mechanism to a 
flight test rig using additive printed bomblet fuselage tubes, slatted fins, parachute box 
and a PerfectFlite altimeter for activation. However, arranging a suitable lifting vehicle 
for the flight test rig and finding a suitable test area proved challenging. There were also 
challenges fielding qualified test personnel, as NPS staff are not permitted to operate 
UAS flights.  As such, it was decided to conduct a nose-down static test from the roof of 
the NPS Rocket Lab, on 27 November 2018. The flight test rig was tied to a rod extended 
from a ladder, with a height of approximately 5.2m (17 ft.), as shown in Figure 19.  
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Figure 19. Nose-down deployment test configuration. 
The kill mechanism was remotely activated using electronics similar to that which 
would be used during a flight test. The test was captured with a high-speed camera. 
Figure 20–23 show the sequence of deployment. 
 
Figure 20. Flight test rig net firing 1. 
Initial deflagration of black 
power charge. Separation of 




Figure 21. Flight test rig net firing 2. 
 
Figure 22. Flight test rig net firing 3. 
 
Figure 23. Flight test rig net firing 4 
Straight extension 
of net main lines.  
Full net expansion 





These images show a clean separation of the kill mechanism cover, straight lines 
to the throw weights and an even and untangled deployment of the net over a large area. 
Such a deployment, in an operational context, would have a high likelihood of success 
against a threat drone. 
B. BOMBLET TESTING 
To test the submunition, the bomblet was mounted on top of a 191mm diameter 
rocket and launched at the Friends of Amateur Rocketry site, in Randsburg, California. 
The intent was to demonstrate successful separation of the submunition from the delivery 
vehicle and controlled flight through visual guidance from the ground, based on imagery 
from the onboard camera. The mounting of the bomblet is depicted in Figure 24 and 
Figure 25. 
 
Figure 24. Nose-mounted submunition 
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Figure 25. Nose-mounted submunition on rocket in launch 
configuration. 
The test was unsuccessful due to the bomblet departing the rocket prior to the 
rocket attaining apogee. And while it provided continuous video during its descent, the 
bomblet was unable to demonstrate control responsiveness. Reviewing footage from the 
bomblet (Figure 26) and cameras on the rocket (Figure 27), damage to the rocket nose 
cone (Figure 28) and from analysis of the bomblet wreckage (Figure 29), it was 
discovered that bomblet broke into two pieces, at the join of the servo housing and the 
avionics bay. The front half of the bomblet departed the rocket early, while the servo 
section remained on the rocket till it was ejected at apogee by the separation mechanism 
as planned. The lack of a pressure relief port in the stowage tube for the bomblet caused 
the bomblet to rise in the tube which resulted in partial deployment of the fins (as seen in 
Figure 26). It is likely that shear forces experienced as the rocket accelerated and pitched, 
resulted in the structural failure which broke the bomblet. 
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Figure 26. Servo section with partially deployed fins, remaining on the 
rocket, as seen from the submunition camera. 
 
Figure 27. Front half of the bomblet falling away from rocket as seen 





Figure 28. Gouging caused in the submunition stowage tube by the 
departing bomblet. 
 
Figure 29. Bomblet front half debris field at impact location. 
Despite the failure of the test, the survival of some structural components and 
operability of electronic components throughout the structural failure and crash would 
indicate that the design is worth further exploration. Future testing, would ideally include 
a graduated testing campaign starting with drop tests from a multicopter, to an eventual 




The evolution of low-cost avionics and higher performance UAS available to the 
public has inevitably led to the weaponization of commercially available UAS and will 
likely lead to the employment of offensive swarms of such vehicles in the future. 
Successfully countering such a threat will require defenses which address both the 
tactical consideration of potentially overwhelming numbers, and the strategic 
consideration of cost asymmetry. 
To understand the threat, Survivability methodology was employed to study the 
susceptibility of small UAS and assess the vulnerability of a representative threat. This 
analysis was used to inform the Concept of Operations for the employment of a low-cost 
small UAS counter swarm system consisting of a Delivery Vehicle, Submunitions and 
Kill Mechanism. 
Since affordability was a major consideration of this research project, the 
development of the system took advantage of low-cost processes (such as additive 
manufacturing) and publicly available hardware (COTS, hobby grade, etc.). As 
demonstrated, it would be possible to develop a submunition that could target a threat 
UAS for less than $600 (in components), to be flown on a delivery vehicle built with 
approximately $4300 of components, and capable of carrying multiple submunitions.  
 The demonstrated kill mechanism (of a large Dyneema net to be used as a fouling 
mechanism), was demonstrated with several deployment tests. This mechanism can be 
fitted to the submunitions, with some modifications, to offer a high probability of 
defeating sUAS threat systems. Such designs represent major advances in the reduction 
of cost asymmetry and feasibility of low-cost small UAS counter-swarm weapons. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Several areas of development remain to be addressed. Priority should be given to 
further development, testing and validation of the Wright bomblet design. Integration 
remains a major area of consideration with efforts required to repackage and redesign the 
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kill mechanism to integrate with the bomblet, along with additional study and design 
required to integrate a submunition carrying the kill mechanism into the delivery vehicle. 
The delivery vehicle itself presents several opportunities for further study and 
design. The delivery vehicle may need to be redesigned based on the number of 
submunitions required, the tactical need for delayed deployment of the submunitions 
(based on changes to the CONOPS), and evolution of the sensor concept. Additionally, 
the separation dynamics of the submunitions from the delivery vehicles requires 
independent aerodynamic analysis. 
Beyond further validation and testing of the Wright bomblet design, there is a 
requirement to improve and implement the guidance, navigation and control (GNC) 
systems and logic. While ground control is acceptable for testing, operational deployment 
would require the development of specific GNC concepts. 
Finally, there is the opportunity for the exploration of lethality enhancements to 
the kill mechanism. These could range from material selection or construction to 
dramatically increase aerodynamic drag once attached to the target drone, to the 
incorporation of a charge device to pass high voltage charges onto the drone, disrupting 




Table 15. Parts list for representative threat system designed by Capt. 
Kai Grohe 
Component Name Weight (kg) Cost (USD) 
Motor Turnigy L5055A-400 Brushless 
Outrunner 400kv 
0.293 39.13  
Propeller Master Airscrew Propeller 12x8 0.041 4.44  
Battery Turnigy Graphene 6000mAh 4S 65C 
Lipo Pack w/XT90 
0.742 96.72  
ESC TURNIGY Basic 25amp Speed 
Controller w/BEC 
0.045 16.45  
Avionics 3dr Pixhawk Mini 0.0382 229.99  
Servos AeroStar™ AS-463HB Standard 
Servo 3.95kg / 0.12sec / 45.5g 
0.1362 15.48 
Airframe Skywalker X-6 FPV Wing EPO 
1500mm (Kit) 
0.77 126.11  
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